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I. INTRODUCTION 
The majority of police departments in the United States changed 
their policing practices in various ways in the 1980s and 1990s in a 
group of varied reforms often lumped together under the heading of “the 
new policing.”
1
 While earlier police reform efforts focused on profes-
sionalizing the force,
2
 the new policing emphasized a shift away from a 
model built on reacting to crime—responding to 911 calls and investigat-
ing reported crimes—toward a more proactive model designed to stop 
crimes from occurring in the first place.
3
 
Different police departments employ different proactive strategies 
in the service of deterring crime under this new policing framework. 
Some have been inspired by the “broken windows” theory made famous 
in a 1982 article by George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson. Their cen-
tral idea is that allowing disorder to exist unchecked facilitates a break-
down of social norms and community controls, which in turn sends a 
signal to would-be criminals that “no one at the scene of disorder cares,” 
increasing fear in the community, and therefore spawning more disorder 
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 1. A 1994 study found that 80% of the polled police chiefs reported they were employing some 
aspect of new policing techniques. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE 
PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 47 (2001); Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407 (2000); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in 
Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997). 
 2. Livingston, supra note 1, at 568. 
 3. For a discussion of the relationship between social norms and broken windows policing, see, 
for example, Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 
(1997); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 805 (1998). 
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and crime.
4
 Inspired by this insight, many departments have employed 
tactics designed to maintain order. Some departments emphasized a 
greater police presence to increase the perception of orderliness.
5
 In other 
places, increasing the perception of order has meant aggressive enforce-
ment of so-called quality-of-life crimes, such as prohibitions on aggres-
sive panhandling, unlicensed vending, public drunkenness, turnstile 
jumping, or graffiti. For some departments, more police stops and frisks 
are the key to maintaining order.
6
 In an effort to target youth crime, other 
communities have turned to anti-loitering or anti-gang ordinances, youth 
curfews, or reward programs for people who turn in gun possessors.
7
 
Another key approach that has been grouped under the new polic-
ing heading has been a turn to community policing. Many departments 
began to place great weight on improved community interactions and 
partnerships to figure out the community’s priorities and how best to ad-
dress them.
8
 This interaction could take the form of more officers walk-
ing a beat, regular community outreach meetings, or more authority vest-
ed in the beat cop as opposed to centralized police management. 
Still another facet of the new policing emphasizes the use of data 
and intelligence to identify hot spots or key criminal actors in an effort to 
improve the deployment of resources. The New York Police Department 
(NYPD), for instance, uses satellite imagery and computerized data anal-
ysis to identify zones of high crime density, unearth trends and patterns, 
and then develop a proactive policing strategy that responds to what the 
data reveals.
9
 For example, the NYPD’s Operation Impact takes discrete 
hot spots—some as small as a single housing development—and 
“floods” the area with a large police presence.
10
 Boston’s police force, to 
                                                          
 4. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, 
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 7. Meares & Kahan, supra note 3, at 812, 819–25. 
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tive to shift strategies. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796dd (1994); Livingston, supra, note 1, at 575 (describing 
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384 (2011). The NYPD employs what is known as CompStat, a data-driven management style that 
assembles all precinct commanders in one meeting to create social pressures and motivators for 
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take another example, uses computerized analysis of reports and investi-
gations to identify particularly dangerous individuals in communities so 
those individuals can be swiftly punished when they transgress.
11
 
New policing in the street crime context has not gone without criti-
cism. Some of the tactics associated with the new policing—particularly 
aggressive stop-and-frisk tactics—have come under fire for their dispro-
portionate impact on communities of color. And although new policing 
techniques have been associated with reductions in crime, critics have 
questioned the extent of that relationship.
12
 Skeptics of the new policing 
have further argued that even if it reduces some crimes, the approach 
involves greater costs than benefits, particularly because the impact of 
heightened enforcement of misdemeanor and quality-of-life offenses 
falls disproportionately on minority and economically disadvantaged in-
dividuals
13
 and because the tactics may undermine the legitimacy of the 
police, which in turn reduces the cooperation of the community in 
fighting crime.
14
 Scholars have created a rich literature that seeks to iden-
                                                                                                                                  
commanders to promptly respond to adverse changes in crime statistics. Heymann, supra note 1, at 
431. 
 11. Id. at 414. 
 12. For a sampling of the debate over the effectiveness of new policing techniques, see, for 
example, HARCOURT, supra note 1; RALPH B. TAYLOR, BREAKING AWAY FROM BROKEN 
WINDOWS: BALTIMORE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE NATIONWIDE FIGHT AGAINST CRIME, GUNS, 
FEAR, AND DECLINE 17–23 (2001); Vanessa Barker, Explaining the Great American Crime Decline: 
A Review of Blumstein and Wallman, Goldberger and Rosenfeld, and Zimring, 35 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 489, 500 (2010) (citing studies); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: 
New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 274–75 
(2006); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public 
Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 606 (1999); 
George L. Kelling & William H. Sousa, Jr., Do Police Matter?: An Analysis of the Impact of New 
York City’s Police Reforms, in MANHATTAN INSTITUTE CENTER FOR CIVIC INNOVATION CIVIC 
REPORT No. 22 (2001), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr_22.htm; Ralph B. 
Taylor, Crime, Grime, Fear, and Decline: A Longitudinal Look, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 
RESEARCH IN BRIEF (July 1999), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/177603.pdf; Carolyn 
Y. Johnson, Breakthrough on “Broken Windows,” BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 8, 2009, available at 
http://www.dcvb-nc.com/cr/Broken_Windows-%20Lowell02-08-09.pdf. 
 13. See Heymann, supra note 1, at 418; see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and 
Black Families: The Collateral Damage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005 (2001); 
Gary Stewart, Note, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony in Anti-
Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249 (1998). But see William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and 
Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795 (1998) (arguing that because racism can also result in under en-
forcement of the law, the motivations may be more complicated, perhaps informed by paternalism, 
and pointing out that poor neighborhoods with high crime are the most cost-effective places to po-
lice). 
 14. See Aziz Z. Huq et al., Why Does the Public Cooperate with Law Enforcement?, 17 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 419 (2011); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Coopera-
tion: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
231 (2008). 
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But just about all the attention to new policing techniques thus far 
has focused on street crime. It is not hard to understand why. The new 
policing largely began as an outgrowth of the broken windows theory 
that calls for an aggressive response to signs of disorder; thus, it is quite 
literally the broken window seen from the street and other tangible signs 
of neglect in a community that prompted the development of these new 
strategies. 
Crime, however, is not limited to the streets. Business crime has 
been a significant problem in the United States.
16
 Indeed, by some 
measures, it is on the rise and an increasing source of concern for law 
enforcement. Just as the spike in street crime in the 1980s prompted new 
policing strategies, the growth in business crime is beginning to spur a 
change in policing tactics in this context as well. And some key en-
forcement actors in the business crime context have turned to the new 
policing of street crime for inspiration. 
The central goal of this Article is to describe the burgeoning turn to 
new policing techniques in the business crime context and to offer some 
initial thoughts on the promises and limits of the approach. Part II begins 
by explaining the traditional or “old policing” of business crime. After 
implementing an initial strategy that focused on pursuing individuals, the 
government turned its attention to the organizations where those individ-
uals operated. It increased the sanctions for violators and sought to target 
companies in an effort to prompt them to adopt internal compliance pro-
grams. The focus on company compliance programs was designed to 
change corporate culture, sharing with the broken windows theory a fo-
cus on norms. This policy did not, however, stop enormous corporate 
frauds or the economic meltdown that occurred in 2007 and 2008 that 
many believe depended on illegal activities. 
In response to these failures, Part III argues, the United States is 
embarking on a new era in policing business crime that, like the new po-
licing of street crime, aims to be more proactive. And like its street crime 
counterpart, business crime policing is pursuing different approaches. 
                                                          
 15. See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga & Brenda J. Bond, Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A 
Randomized Controlled Trial, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 577, 599 (2008) (noting that while cleaning up a 
trouble spot has been found to reduce calls to the police, more aggressive misdemeanor arrests did 
not produce crime-prevention gains). 
 16. Defining white-collar crime is not a straightforward task. In this article, I am focusing on 
crime that (1) occurs in a legitimate occupational context; (2) involves the attempt to acquire or the 
acquisition of money, property, or business advantage; and (3) is not characterized by physical vio-
lence. 
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One approach relies on intelligence-led methods that use extensive 
data analysis to target problematic areas and actors. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), arguably the most important entity polic-
ing financial crime, is the key actor pursuing this strategy. It established 
the Office of Market Intelligence, a central repository for all complaints 
and data analysis. And the SEC has dedicated specialized units to inter-
pret data in particular contexts with the aim of identifying white-collar 
hot spots and actors that merit closer scrutiny. The SEC also recently 
passed a rule to make it easier for the agency itself to identify wrongdo-
ing—instead of relying solely on complaints and tips supplied by oth-
ers—by creating a uniform audit trail. Additional regulatory approaches 
include providing new incentives for whistleblowers within the organiza-
tion. 
Another approach to new policing in the business crime context fol-
lows a different blueprint and is akin to those street crime methods that 
aim to change social norms. The Department of Justice (DOJ)—the 
United States’ chief prosecutor of financial crimes—is taking a more 
active role for itself inside companies, at least for those companies that 
have already demonstrated a propensity for wrongdoing. DOJ increasing-
ly allows companies to enter deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) or 
non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) that allow companies to avoid crim-
inal charges if they agree to terms set by prosecutors.
17
 The content of 
these agreements reflects a new, more aggressive approach to policing 
wrongdoing that goes beyond the compliance programs of the old polic-
ing. For example, through DPAs and NPAs, the government routinely 
installs monitors who report what they see and hear directly to the gov-
ernment. Thus, instead of relying on the company to report violations 
and then reacting to it, now the government proactively seeks to identify 
problems through the use of an agent it has installed in the company. The 
government has also ordered changes in personnel and company business 
practices, further placing itself in charge of changing norms. 
Another effort to change norms through criminal policing involves 
the increasing use of wiretaps to investigate insider trading. Although 
that particular policing technique is not necessarily proactive and can be 
used reactively to investigate a reported instance of abuse, DOJ is cur-
rently using it in the spirit of the new policing paradigm. Market partici-
                                                          
 17. Under a DPA, the government charges the company, but the agreement states that prosecu-
tion will be deferred for some period of time. If within that period of time the company meets all of 
the terms of the agreement, the government will dismiss the charges. Under an NPA, no charging 
document is filed against the company. Instead, the government and company reach an agreement 
that no charges will be filed as long as the company meets the terms of the agreement. 
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pants and the general public share the view that insider trading is com-
monplace, so the absence of prosecutions sends a message that the gov-
ernment does not care. It is thus analogous to the broken window that no 
one fixes. The message sent is that disorder is prevalent, which in turn 
erodes the social norms that help constrain criminal conduct. Wiretaps, 
and particularly well-publicized ones, seek to alter that perception by 
suggesting the government does care—because it is listening. 
Thus, both civil and criminal enforcement actors—the “police” of 
white-collar crime—are beginning to see the value in improved govern-
ment detection methods and a proactive enforcement approach. The 
strategies differ, just as they have in the street crime context; however, 
they share in common a shift away from purely reactive methods, where 
private actors take the lead in reporting crime, to proactive methods 
where the government takes the initiative in deterring crime.   
Finally, Part IV explores how the new policing techniques in the 
business crime context are likely to play out, given that business crime is 
different from street crime in fundamental ways. Part IV further explains 
what those differences mean for the ultimate success of the new policing 
paradigm. Part V concludes. 
II. THE “OLD POLICING” OF BUSINESS CRIME 
The policing of business crime was not particularly robust prior to 
the 1990s. Incentives for misbehavior were strong because of the finan-
cial rewards, either directly from the proceeds of the crime or indirectly 
because the behavior benefitted the company and therefore improved an 
individual’s standing within it.
18
 The disincentives were relatively weak. 
These crimes were rarely detected,
19
 and even when the crime was dis-
covered, identifying the perpetrator within the organization was often 
difficult.
20
 Moreover, the sanctions themselves were relatively light. 
The enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) in 
1987 marked a shift in the approach to white-collar crime. First, the 
                                                          
 18. Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion to Impose Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW 
TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 62, 70 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011). 
 19. I. J. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? (Univ. of Chi. 
Booth School of Bus., Working Paper No. 08-22, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=891482 (finding that the SEC detected fewer than 6% of corporate 
frauds committed between 1996 and 2004 and that only 16% of frauds were uncovered by non-
financial market regulators). 
 20. Arlen, supra note 18, at 70 (“[C]orporate crimes often involve actions by many people, and 
often the person who committed the physical act that constitutes the crime is not the person who 
made the decision to commit it.”). 
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Guidelines increased the penalties for white-collar frauds. Whereas Con-
gress was willing to let the Sentencing Commission set penalties for oth-
er offenses based on historical treatment, it singled out white-collar 
crimes (and drug offenses) to be treated more severely.
21
 The Senate Re-
port accompanying the Sentencing Reform Act, which created the Sen-
tencing Commission, observed that pre-Guidelines sentencing practices 
were “creating the impression” that fines in white-collar cases “can be 
written off as a cost of doing business” and that corporate offenders “fre-
quently do not receive sentences that reflect the seriousness of their of-
fenses.”
22
 Fines thus increased substantially,
23
 and thousands of white-
collar defendants who previously would have received a sentence of pro-
bation were sent to prison.
24
 After judges, prosecutors, and probation 
officers complained that even those increases were inadequate, in 2001 
the Commission further raised sentences for business crimes causing 
losses in excess of $70,000.
25
 Today, federal sentences for business 
crimes are at a historical high, both in terms of the number of prison sen-
tences and the length of those sentences.
26
 
Second, the Guidelines also focused on organization liability. Be-
fore the 1990s, policing organizations was minimal.
27
 Corporate fines 
were typically negligible, and the government did not insist that an or-
ganization cooperate in identifying lawbreakers within the firm or adopt 
significant changes in operation.
28
 The Guidelines fundamentally 
                                                          
 21. E.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1989) (amending 
scattered sections of Title 21); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 77 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3260 (“Some major offenders, particularly white-collar offenders . . . , frequently do not re-
ceive sentences that reflect the seriousness of their offenses.”). 
 22. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 76–77 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3259. 
 23. Frank O. Bowman, III, Are We Really Getting Tough on White Collar Crime?, 15 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 237 (2003) (noting that sentences for economic crimes “represent a marked increase 
over those” that were meted out before the Guidelines). 
 24. See id. at 238; see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key 
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 21–24 (1988) (observing that the 
Commission departed from past practice in the case of white-collar crime). 
 25. Bowman, supra note 23, at 238. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Organizations are criminally responsible for employee acts under a theory of respondeat 
superior liability as long as the employee has the requisite level of intent for the crime, commits the 
act within the scope of his or her employment, and does so with the intent to benefit the corporation. 
Developments in the Law—Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal 
Sanction, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1243, 1247–50 (1979). Corporations can be convicted even if no indi-
vidual is charged; the prosecution just needs to show that “some agent of the corporation committed 
the crime.” Id. at 1248 (emphasis in original).  
 28. Arlen, supra note 18, at 69 (noting that corporate fines “were established with individuals 
in mind” and “were quite low relative to both harm caused by corporate crime and most firms’ abil-
ity to pay”); Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on Sentencing Practice 
in the Federal Courts, 1988–1990, 71 B.U. L. REV. 247, 254 (1991) (evaluating fines levied upon 
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changed the landscape for entity liability prosecutions. Just as sanctions 
for individual criminal liability increased, so did sanctions for corporate 
offenders.
29
 Under the Guidelines, companies can get sentencing reduc-
tions if they promptly report violations and cooperate with the govern-
ment in the investigation of the wrongdoing.
30
 The Guidelines also en-
courage organizational change by offering reductions for companies that 
have effective compliance programs
31
 and, for those companies that do 
not already have an effective program, the Guidelines allow for judges to 




In the Commission’s view, an effective compliance program must 
“establish standards and procedures to prevent and detect criminal con-
duct.”
33
 Specific individuals within an organization shall be delegated 
day-to-day operational responsibility for the program and must report to 
high-level personnel within the organization
34
 who are responsible for 
overseeing the compliance and ethics program.
35
 A successful program 
must involve monitoring and auditing to detect unlawful conduct.
36
 It 
must also provide for anonymous or confidential reporting by employees 
and a way for employees to seek guidance about potential wrongdoing.
37
 
The program must have incentives for compliance with the standards, 
and procedures and disciplinary measures for non-compliance.
38
 The 
goal of these requirements is to encourage companies to adopt programs 
                                                                                                                                  
corporations between 1984 and 1988 and finding that the median fine, given in 63% of cases from 
1984 to 1987 and in 53% of cases in 1988, was $10,000). 
 29. Cindy R. Alexander et al., Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines 
and the Sentencing of Public Firms, 42 J.L. & ECON. 393, 394 (1999) (noting the increase in fines 
and sanctions for convicted entities after adoption of the Sentencing Guidelines). These fines were 
significantly increased again with passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 
§ 805(a)(2). 
 30. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) (2006). 
 31. Id. § 8C2.5(f). 
 32. John R. Steer, Changing Organizational Behavior—The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Experiment Begins to Bear Fruit 6 (Apr. 26, 2001) (unpublished paper) (presented at the Twenty-
Ninth Annual Conference on Value Inquiry, Tulsa, Oklahoma), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/Organizational_Guidelines/Selected_Articles/CorpBehavior2.pdf. 
 33. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(1). 
 34. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B). 
 35. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2). 
 36. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(A). 
 37. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(C). 
 38. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(6). 
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that will help them do a better job policing, deterring wrongdoing,
39
 and 
creating a corporate culture of ethical and lawful behavior.
40
 
Other federal government entities share the Guidelines’ view that 
compliance programs are to be encouraged. For example, the Department 
of Justice takes the existence of compliance programs into account in 
deciding whether to charge companies in the first place.
41
 DOJ urges 
prosecutors to evaluate the comprehensiveness of the program and scru-
tinize it closely to make sure “corporate management is enforcing the 
program” and not “tacitly encouraging or pressuring employees to en-
gage in misconduct to achieve business objectives.”
42
 The goal is to sort 
“paper program[s]” from those that are “designed and implemented in an 
effective manner.”
43
 DOJ also takes into account how companies respond 
when they uncover wrongdoing, looking for “authentic” corporate coop-





 the Environmental Protection Agency,
46
 and the 
                                                          
 39. Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of 
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 754 (1997). 
 40. Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee Con-
duct? The Antecedents of Rule Following in Work Settings, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1143 (2005); see, 
e.g., Kathleen M. Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitoring” Corporate Corruption: 
DOJ’s Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Health Care, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 89, 93 (2009); 
John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Crime and Custom in Corporate Society: A Cultural Per-
spective on Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1997). 
 41. The Department of Justice’s principles for charging corporations in 1999 listed eight fac-
tors for prosecutors to consider, including “[t]he existence and adequacy of the corporation’s com-
pliance program” and “any efforts to implement an effective corporate compliance program or to 
improve an existing one.” Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys (June 16, 1999), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/chargingcorps.PDF. The Department 
of Justice has continued to list the existence of a compliance program as a factor for prosecutors to 
consider in deciding whether to charge a company. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 20, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/ 
2003jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Thompson Memo]; U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 9-28.300, -28.800, available at http://www.justice. 
gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm. 
 42. Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of 
Dep’t Components, U.S. Att’ys 15 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/ reading-
room/dag-memo-08282008.pdf [hereinafter Filip Memo]. 
 43. Id. at 16. 
 44. Thompson Memo, supra note 41, at 1. 
 45. SEC, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 44969 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm#P16_500 (noting that in deciding whether 
to bring an enforcement action or to give cooperation credit, the SEC will take into account whether 
a company “adopt[s] and ensure[s] enforcement of new and more effective internal controls and 
procedures designed to prevent a recurrence of the misconduct”). 
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Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector Gen-
eral
47
—similarly consider compliance programs in deciding whether to 
pursue regulatory actions. And many of these compliance regimes are 
buttressed by expanded statutory duties to report.
48
 
The basic model, then, largely depends on corporate monitoring 
and cooperation.
49
 The company becomes, in Harry First’s words, the 
“branch office of the prosecutor.”
50
 Under this policing model, the organ-
ization is a key part of the policing strategy, and the hope is that a vibrant 
compliance program will change the company’s culture. So, like the bro-
ken windows theory, the goal is to shift social norms by having compa-
nies change from within. But unlike other new policing strategies, the 
government largely sits in a reactionary position to respond to what the 
company reports and finds. To be sure, crimes can come to the govern-
ment’s attention in other ways—such as through complaints or whistle-
blowers—but the approach is still reactive. Proactive policing under this 
model takes place largely within the corporation itself. 
The old policing of business crime thus shares much in common 
with the old policing of street crime. Both are mainly reactive models, 
where the police largely wait for reports of wrongdoing and then investi-
gate. While companies may engage in proactive oversight and attempt to 
change norms, that proactive effort is initiated by corporations and takes 
place within corporations, not by outside law enforcers. 
                                                                                                                                  
 46. Final Policy Statement on Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction 
and Prevention of Violations, 60 FED. REG. 66, 706 (Dec. 22, 1995) (policy statement designed to 
encourage self-regulation and reporting of environmental violations); Steer, supra note 32, at 14 
(noting that EPA also adopted a criminal enforcement policy that takes into account compliance 
programs). 
 47. Steer, supra note 32, at 14 (describing the HHS OIG compliance program guides for pro-
viders in the health care industry); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of 
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 500 (2003) (noting that HHS modeled its approach 
after the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines). 
 48. For example, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the SEC regulations promulgated thereunder 
“now permit lawyers to disclose a client’s ‘material violation’ to the Commission, and failure to do 
so may carry significant sanctions.” Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties 
Within Twenty-First Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1265 (2009). 
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III. THE NEW POLICING OF BUSINESS CRIME 
Despite increasing sanctions and the spread of corporate compli-
ance programs to the point of being ubiquitous,
51
 business crime remains 
a pressing problem.
52
 In its most recent Financial Crimes Report to the 
Public, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) points to steadily in-
creasing financial crime caseloads between 2007 and 2011, and cites in-
sider trading, corporate fraud, and securities and commodities fraud as 
being on the rise, particularly in the wake of the financial crisis and con-
tinuing economic instability.
53
 And serious offenses have occurred at 
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REV. 2089, 2104 (2010). 
 52. Quantification of white-collar crime remains difficult as a result of its broad scope, evolv-
ing character, and limits on data collection. See Sally S. Simpson, Making Sense of White-Collar 
Crime: Theory and Research, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 481, 482–83 (2011) (“It is difficult to measure 
white-collar crime because all of the typical sources of crime data . . . are limited in scope, not col-
lected in a systematic manner, or have unique problems that discourage operationalization and gen-
eralization.”); RODNEY HUFF, CHRISTIAN DESLIETS & JOHN KANE, NAT’L WHITE COLLAR CRIME 
CTR., THE 2010 NATIONAL PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME (2010) (describing challenges 
to measurement of white-collar crime, including the evolution of crime in response to changing 
technology and markets, and surveys that focus narrowly on a segment of the larger category of 
crimes); CYNTHIA BARNETT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES (CJIS) DIV., THE MEASUREMENT OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 
USING UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING (UCR) DATA (2000), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/nibrs_wcc.pdf (describing the competing approaches to defining white-collar crime 
and pointing out the limitations of using National Incident-Based Reporting System data to under-
stand business crime). But the measures we do have suggest it is on the rise. E.g, Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers, Global Economic Crime Survey, Cybercrime: Protecting Against the Growing Threat, 
PCW, 16 (Nov. 2011), http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/economic-crime-survey/assets/GECS_ 
GLOBAL_REPORT.pdf (U.K.); HUFF, DESLIETS & KANE, supra, at 12. 
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institutions with compliance programs, casting doubt on self-policing as 
the primary policing strategy.
54
 
In addition to the economic crime cases that have come to light, 
there is a widespread view among the public that the fiscal crisis of 2008 
was fueled in part by corporate wrongdoing. A 2010 survey found that a 
majority of respondents believed financial crime contributed to the cur-
rent economic crisis, and nearly half agreed that the government is not 
devoting enough resources to combat business crime.
55
 Many lament that 
more individuals and corporations, particularly at the largest financial 
institutions, have not been charged.
56
 This environment set the stage for a 
new approach to policing business crime. 
Both civil and criminal law enforcement officers have started shift-
ing approaches and embracing new policing tactics to combat business 
crime. Business crime is, of course, a wide and varied field, so its police 
force is similarly wide and varied. It includes substantive area specialists, 
like the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and generalist prose-
cutors responsible for policing frauds and schemes. Officials from feder-
al banking regulators to state-level insurance commissioners are part of 
the mix as well. It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer a compre-
hensive list of shifting policing techniques among all possible actors re-
sponsible for policing business crimes—or, for that matter, to catalog 
those pockets (of which there are undoubtedly many) that are policing 
just as they have always done, without changes. Instead, this Article 
looks closely at two key federal actors that bear primary responsibility 
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for policing the biggest frauds: the SEC on the civil side and DOJ on the 
criminal side. This section first explores changes in the civil sphere and 
then turns to new developments by criminal prosecutors. 
A. Regulatory Policing 
As Wall Street’s chief regulator, the SEC is arguably the most im-
portant cop on the beat looking to protect investors from business 
crimes.
57
 The SEC is also well suited for study because it has been the 
subject of so much criticism. The SEC suffered stinging rebukes for fail-
ing to detect the jaw-dropping Ponzi schemes perpetrated by Bernie 
Madoff and R. Allen Stanford.
58
 The SEC’s Inspector General (IG) is-
sued a 457-page report documenting the agency’s missteps and inade-
quacies in investigating Madoff’s $65 billion scheme.
59
 The agency re-
ceived complaints about Madoff going as far back as 1992 that, as the IG 
noted, “raised significant red flags concerning Madoff’s hedge fund op-
erations and should have led to questions about whether Madoff was ac-
tually engaged in trading and should have led to a thorough examination 
and/or investigation of the possibility that Madoff was operating a Ponzi 
scheme.”
60
 Instead, however, the SEC “never took the necessary and 
basic steps to determine if Madoff was misrepresenting his trading.”
61
 
The result, the New York Times stated, is that “[n]ot since the 1950s, 
when budget cuts and deregulation defanged the commission, have [the 
SEC’s] stature and influence sunk so low”
62
 as it did in the wake of the 
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Madoff scandal. This is on top of the criticisms heaped on the agency for 
failing to stop or stem the tide of the financial crisis.
63
 Critics of the 
agency are “legion,” with one reader survey from Kiplinger’s reporting 
that less than a quarter of its respondents believe “the SEC is effective in 
policing the stock market.”
64
 
The SEC took note of the widespread criticism and crisis of confi-
dence in its effectiveness, and it has responded with significant structural 
shifts in policing “to restore its credibility.”
65
 The SEC altered both its 
institutional design and the manner in which it collects information, all in 
an effort to improve policing. It remains to be seen whether the new po-
licing mechanisms at the agency will ultimately pay off—particularly as 
the agency fights for resources
66
 and faces the daunting task of promul-
gating all the substantive regulations called for under the Dodd–Frank 
Act.
67
 But there is no denying that the agency’s approach to policing is 
fundamentally changing. This section looks at changes in intelligence-led 
policing, consolidated audit trails, and the treatment of whistleblowers 
within corporations. 
1. Intelligence-Led Policing at the SEC 
The SEC’s Enforcement Division proclaimed that it responded to 
the Madoff scandal with “its most significant reorganization since its 
establishment in 1972.”
68
 The centerpiece of this reorganization was the 
creation of a central database for all the tips, complaints, and referrals the 
agency receives and a new office to analyze the database called the Of-
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port, DAVIS POLK (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.davispolk.com/Dodd-Frank-Rulemaking-Progress-
Report/. 
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Head of New Office of Market Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 
2010/2010-5.htm. 
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fice of Market Intelligence (OMI). OMI has been described as a “point 
guard” for the agency.
69
 Its tasks are to sift through the data to make the 
necessary connections between information, conduct preliminary inves-
tigations, and then assign cases to enforcement lawyers where appropri-
ate.
70
 In the phrasing of the initial director of OMI, “it’s the central intel-
ligence office for the whole agency.” It even puts out a daily “intelli-
gence report” with the hottest tips it receives each day and has placed 
FBI agents within the agency to help sort through the information.
71
 
This strategy is thus in the very heartland of the intelligence-led po-
licing model that relies on analyzing information to make the best use of 
limited resources to prevent crime.
72
 Having a central clearinghouse 
means the agency can identify patterns of trouble. For example, during 
the flash crash of 2010, OMI was able to identify a common issue that 
came to its attention. Many people who had placed stop-loss orders di-
recting their broker to sell when a stock dropped to a certain price 
thought those orders would act as a sort of insurance policy and would 
cap their losses based on the “stop” price. While the stop loss orders may 
work that way when the market is functioning normally, that was not 
possible during the flash crash. The order to sell is computer-activated 
after the predetermined stop price is reached, and the ultimate price is 
determined by when the stock actually sells. During the flash crash, pric-
es fell rapidly and the stop-loss trades could not be made quickly enough, 
so many investors saw their shares sold at prices well below the stop 
price. Because OMI was able to trace hundreds of messages with this 
kind of complaint from its database during the crash, it was able to 
quickly identify this problem for the Chairman of the SEC to address.
73
 
In addition, the new office structure is valuable for identifying off 
market schemes
74
 because no exchange polices those transactions, leav-
ing it up to the SEC to fill the gap.
75
 It is also useful for frauds associated 
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with microcap securities, an area that did not previously receive as much 
attention from the SEC because scam cases of that nature “did not build 
careers” and could get overlooked.
76
 OMI is now well positioned to iden-
tify these cases because they come into the central clearinghouse and 
patterns emerge more readily. 
In a similar vein, in 2009, the SEC created the Division of Risk, 
Strategy, and Financial Innovation (RSFI). The SEC refers to this part of 
the agency as its “think tank”: a place to “integrate financial economics 
and rigorous data analytics into the core mission of the SEC” and across 
all of the SEC’s activities, from rulemaking to enforcement and examina-
tion.
77
 In late 2012, this Division introduced the Accounting Quality 
Model (AQM), which uses quantitative analysis to monitor corporations 
for accounting fraud.
78
 Craig Lewis, the SEC Chief Economist and Di-
rector of RSFI, noted that the AQM “aligns closely with our underlying 
approach to data-driven analytics.”
79
 The model seeks to identify firms 
that have “outlier discretionary accruals,” that is, a meaningfully differ-
ent amount of discretionary accruals compared to other similarly situated 
firms, because this could be indicative of fraud.
80
 Those companies, in 
turn, can be subject to a closer look. In other words, the data helps the 
agency be more proactive in identifying potential targets for closer inves-
tigation. 
A similar strategy is being employed in the Office of Compliance 
Inspections and Examinations (OCIE). OCIE is responsible for examin-
ing “investment advisers, investment companies, broker–dealers, munic-
ipal securities dealers, transfer agents, clearing agencies, self regulatory 
organizations (SROs), municipal advisors, and others” to ensure they are 
in compliance with SEC protocols, to prevent fraud, to provide data for 
policy, and to monitor risk.
81
 To address its lack of sufficient resources 
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and understaffing, OCIE has moved away from cyclical examinations to 
more quantitative and risk-based models that allow it to make more of its 
limited resources and focus on the most problematic areas.
82
 Thus, just as 
police departments have turned to improved intelligence models to com-
pensate for understaffing so, too, has the SEC.
83
 The SEC added an Of-
fice of Risk Analysis and Surveillance (ORAS) to crunch numbers in 
order to determine which firms most needed examination. The SEC also 
hired several experts in highly specialized financial fields.
84
 These new 
quantitative strategies are used to target specific areas of concern, includ-
ing the creation of complex entities, the sale of new or risky products, 
and cybersecurity.
85
 The SEC has also created a Large Firm Monitoring 
program to further aid in monitoring the complexities of large corpora-
tions and a Quantitative Analytics Unit to monitor high-frequency trad-
ers.
86
 And the former director of OCIE has explained that the SEC has 




These are not the only structural changes at the agency designed to 
assist with proactive policing and greater use of data. The SEC also es-
tablished specialized units in five areas it deemed as “priority” that in-
volve particularly complex areas of security laws.
88
 These units are also 
dedicated to ferreting out suspicious activities and patterns using their 
expertise and sophisticated data analysis. One unit focuses on asset man-
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agement investigations involving investment advisors, hedge funds, and 
private equity funds. This unit’s Aberrational Performance Inquiry—
developed with help from RSFI’s Office of Quantitative Research and 
OCIE
89
—uses risk-based analytics “to analyze performance data of thou-
sands of hedge fund advisers and identify candidates appropriate for ex-
amination or investigation.”
90
 A second unit targets “large-scale market 
abuses and complex manipulation schemes.” Using statistical tools like 
“cluster analysis” and “fuzzy matching,” this unit identifies “suspicious 
trading patterns and relationships and connections among multiple trad-
ers and across multiple securities.”
91
 The unit’s methodology has already 
borne fruit, as enforcement actions have been brought as a result of this 
research that otherwise would have gone undetected.
92
 A third unit sets 
its sights on structured and new products, such as complex derivatives, 
credit default swaps, and collateralized debt obligations—the kind of 
products at the root of the financial crisis. A fourth unit deals with for-
eign corrupt practices, and a fifth deals with “misconduct in the large 
municipal securities market and in connection with public pension 
funds.” Robert Khuzami, the Director of the Division of Enforcement 
who established these units, explained their creation as responding to the 
challenge posed by “the complexity and high-velocity pace of innovation 
in financial products, transactions, and markets” by deploying experts 
who possess an understanding of these markets and products that will 
allow them “to adopt a more proactive approach to identifying conduct 
and practices ripe for investigation.” 
Khuzami thus employed the language of the new policing in ex-
plaining the SEC’s structural changes when he emphasized the need for 
proactive engagement. With street crime, it means deeper knowledge of 
and interaction with communities, coupled with data analysis, either 
along the lines of CompStat or newer intelligence-led policing models.
93
 
With financial crime, it means deeper knowledge of the complicated fi-
nancial products and markets that are used to perpetrate frauds, coupled 
with the data analysis of OMI. As Anne Milgram, the former Attorney 
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General of New Jersey, notes, these strategies are analogous to the data-
driven statistical analysis used to transform baseball strategy that was 
described in Michael Lewis’s book, Moneyball.
94
 “Moneyballing crimi-
nal justice” with data-driven statistical analysis has the same aim of im-
proving results with fewer resources. 
2. The Consolidated Audit Trail 
The SEC has also sought to improve its policing abilities by 
prompting the industry to create a consolidated audit trail. Under the cur-
rent regulatory landscape, the SEC cannot trace trades in one location. 
Instead, 
regulators today must attempt to cobble together disparate data from 
a variety of existing information systems lacking in completeness, 
accuracy, accessibility, and/or timeliness—a model that neither 
supports the efficient aggregation of data from multiple trading 
venues nor yields the type of complete and accurate market activity 
data needed for robust market oversight.
95
 
So, for instance, under this system, if the SEC were to receive a tip about 
insider trading, it cannot cross-reference all the relevant trades in one 
database. It has to contact each relevant market center, which may be an 
exchange, alternative trading system, or over-the-counter broker–
dealers.
96
 Or, to take another example, when something like a flash crash 
occurs, the SEC cannot rapidly investigate to figure out the triggers. In-
deed, audit trails and other sources of market data are the key to most of 
the SEC’s investigative work and its regulatory agenda.
97
 “[T]he Com-
mission relies on market data to improve its understanding of how mar-
kets operate and evolve, including with respect to the development of 
new trading practices, the reconstruction of atypical or novel market 
events, and the implications of new markets or market rules.”
98
 The lack 
of a comprehensive audit trail is thus a significant impediment to proac-
tive policing by the agency and hinders its regulatory mission as well. 
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 95. Final Rule, Consolidated Audit Trail, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67457, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, 6 (July 18, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/34-67457.pdf [hereinafter 
SEC Final Rule]. 
 96. Id. at 4. 
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In the absence of its own comprehensive audit trail, the SEC cur-
rently relies largely on exchanges and national securities associations 
(self-regulatory organizations or SROs) to do market surveillance for 
insider trading and other abuses.
99
 Thus, the existing regime puts the 
SEC in the position of reacting to whatever issues are raised by the SROs 
or other complainants, and the SEC is thereby limited in setting its own 
policing agenda. Observers have cast doubt on how effective SROs are at 
policing,
100
 putting pressure on the SEC to assume a greater role. 
These concerns prompted the SEC to adopt Rule 613, which will 
create a comprehensive, consolidated audit trail and put the SEC in a po-
sition to engage in more proactive oversight. The comprehensive consol-
idated audit trail will be “a system capable of capturing a complete rec-
ord of all transactions relating to an order, from origination to execution 
or cancellation, and the complete record for an order generated by such a 
system,”
101
 including the identity of customers.
102
 To pursue the analogy 
to street crime policing, the consolidated audit trail will be a way for the 
SEC to gain access to more streets so that its own cops can directly ob-
serve the activity there and analyze the information to make better use of 
its resources. 
3. Whistleblowers and Cooperators 
Some police departments have sought to cultivate cooperators and 
informants as part of their new policing regimes in an effort to disrupt 
behavioral norms. By creating incentives for people to report wrongdo-
ing, they hope to change a culture where law breaking becomes normal-
ized. Or, to use Kelling and Wilson’s parlance, the policing regimes are 
trying to change an environment where no one cares enough about the 
broken window to say anything to anyone about it.
103
 In the absence of 
reporting, a culture of apathy establishes norms of disorder and law 
breaking. Thus, the first step in breaking that culture is to get people to 
care enough to tell the authorities about it. 
In the business crime context, that means that whistleblowers need 
to be encouraged. With the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley in 2002, Con-
gress required companies to create sufficient internal channels for indi-
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viduals to report wrongdoing.
104
 The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 went further. That law required the 
SEC to create the Office of the Whistleblower that disburses funds to 
whistleblowers whose tips lead to findings of corporate fraud.
105
 And the 
funds themselves are significant; if a whistleblower voluntarily provides 
original information that significantly contributes to a successful SEC 
enforcement action, and that information results in sanctions greater than 
one million dollars, the whistleblower would then receive 10%–30% of 
the monetary sanctions collected by the SEC.
106
 
In promulgating rules under Dodd–Frank, the Commission similar-
ly put a special emphasis on reporting, or in Chairman Mary Schapiro’s 
words, “break[ing] the silence of those who see a wrong.”
107
 To that end, 
the Commission sought to create a streamlined procedure for reporting 
by requiring the submission of only one form. It refused calls to require 
employees first to report wrongdoing internally before going to the 
SEC,
108
 instead creating financial incentives for reporting and explaining 
that 
[t]he most likely difference between a mandatory regime and the 
significant financial incentives approach is with respect to the cate-
gory of whistleblowers who, prior to the whistleblower award pro-
gram, were not predisposed to report either internally or to the 
Commission, but who are now willing to come forward in response 
to a financial inducement. Within this category of whistleblowers, 
we believe there is some subset who would respond to the financial 
incentive offered by our final rules by reporting only to us, but who 
would not come forward either to us or to the entity if the financial 
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The Commission also sought to create greater incentives for people 
to come forward with information even if they had engaged in wrongdo-
ing themselves. In 2001, it issued what is known as the Seaboard Report, 
in which it explained how the Commission would evaluate company co-
operation by outlining “some of the criteria we will consider in determin-
ing whether, and how much, to credit self-policing, self-reporting, reme-
diation and cooperation.”
110
 But it was not until 2010 that it sought to 
provide guidance on when it would give credit to individual cooperators. 
Calling it a “potential game-changer for the Division of Enforcement,” 
Khuzami announced initiatives to enlist cooperators. Following the mod-
el of the Department of Justice, the SEC adopted the use of cooperation 
agreements—“[f]ormal written agreements in which the Enforcement 
Division agrees to recommend to the Commission that a cooperator re-
ceive credit for cooperating in investigations or related enforcement ac-
tions if the cooperator provides substantial assistance such as full and 
truthful information and testimony.”
111
 The Commission also explained 
how it would “evaluate whether, how much, and in what manner to credit 
cooperation by individuals to ensure that potential cooperation arrange-
ments maximize the Commission’s law enforcement interests.”
112
 In par-
ticular, the SEC identified four general considerations it will take into 
account: 
1. The assistance provided by the cooperating individual; 
2. The importance of the underlying matter in which the individu-
al cooperated; 
3. The societal interest in ensuring the individual is held account-
able for his or her misconduct; and 
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4. The appropriateness of cooperation credit based upon the risk 




Both the whistleblower and cooperation initiatives share the goal of cre-
ating as many incentives as possible to break up any norms of silence 
that allow wrongdoing to become normalized. Both initiatives are thus in 
line with new policing models that seek to change the culture of wrong-
doing. 
B. Criminal Policing 
While business crime can be prosecuted at the local, state, or feder-
al level, “prosecution of significant white-collar offenses has become the 
nearly exclusive province of the federal government.”
114
 The federal 
government’s approach to policing those crimes has shifted. It has used 
its leverage to bring criminal charges to extract concessions from com-
panies that both make future policing easier and amount to substantive 
regulations. In the Southern District of New York—the most important 
prosecutor’s office for business crime because it encompasses Wall 
Street—law enforcement is increasingly borrowing from the playbook of 
police investigations of violent crime organizations. The office has ex-
tensively used wiretaps to successfully prosecute some of the biggest 
insider trading cases in history. And Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for 
the Southern District of New York, also strives to change industry norms 
by engaging in a targeted outreach to the Wall Street community. 
1. Policing Through DPAs and NPAs 
One of the biggest trends in business crime enforcement in recent 
years is the use of DPAs and NPAs in cases against organizations. The 
agreements grew in popularity after the collapse of the accounting firm 
Arthur Andersen in the wake of the government’s decision to charge the 
company with obstruction of justice. Andersen’s demise made plain that 
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an indictment can have tremendous collateral consequences on employ-
ees and shareholders; in Andersen’s case 75,000 jobs were lost.
115
 So the 
government has opted for an approach that gives prosecutors greater 
flexibility with charging. The use of DPAs and NPAs allows the gov-
ernment to set terms of company behavior in exchange for a promise that 
charges will not be filed or will be dismissed. The Department of Justice 
has reached 233 such agreements since 2003,
116
 making DPAs and 
NPAs, in the words of the head of the criminal division at DOJ, “a main-
stay of white-collar criminal law enforcement.”
117
 The SEC has started to 
follow course, adopting the use of such agreements in 2010 as part of its 
initiative to foster greater cooperation in investigations.
118
 
While these agreements contain traditional compliance and policing 
methods such as fines, they are replete with some key elements of the 
new and more proactive policing paradigm. It is noteworthy that, in 
roughly half of these agreements, the government requires the defendant 
company to install a monitor—often a former prosecutor—to oversee its 
compliance efforts.
119
 The monitor then acts as a police officer within the 
company, reporting what he or she sees and hears directly to the gov-
ernment. Instead of relying on the company to report violations (the old 
policing paradigm), installing a monitor gives a government agent access 
to the inner workings of the company. This is analogous to the beat cop 
leaving his or her patrol car to interact with citizens directly on the street. 
The monitor’s vantage point allows for greater surveillance and makes it 
easier for people to report violations.
120
 In that same vein, some DPAs 
and NPAs impose greater reporting requirements on companies to make 
it easier for the government to keep tabs on their behavior.
121
 
Other terms also signify a new approach to policing. These include 
requirements that the company replace particular individuals or abandon 
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specific lines of business or business practices.
122
 These kinds of re-
quirements are fundamentally different than a fine or a pledge not to en-
gage in further criminal conduct. These terms support a strategy of 
changing norms within the organization, either by removing bad apples 
or eliminating temptations for wrongdoing. Thus, just as an anti-loitering 
ordinance seeks to take certain actors away from an area, these agree-
ment terms seek to remove certain actors from the company or take ac-
tors away from circumstances that may prompt criminal conduct (known 
in policing circles as situational prevention).
123
 DOJ explicitly states that 
it uses DPAs and NPAs as “a force for positive change in corporate cul-
ture.”
124
 Prosecutors are acting as “‘norm entrepreneurs,’ not only setting 
standards, but also communicating values”
125
—precisely the style of the 
new policing framework. 
As noted in Part I, there is a vigorous debate over the effectiveness 
of broken windows policing strategies in decreasing urban crime. There-
fore, it is reasonable to question whether this strategy is likely to be any 
more successful in policing business crime. Prosecutors, even when they 
consult with expert agencies like the SEC,
126
 may lack the expertise to 
know what structural reforms will result in greater law-abiding behavior 
within complicated businesses and industries.
127
 And critics have charged 
that prosecutors should not be dictating personnel decisions within a 
company.
128
 Moreover, even if norms within the particular company with 
the DPA or NPA change, that still leaves the rest of the industry. It re-
mains open to question whether changes in one company will have a 
larger influence on the business community. 
But regardless of its effects, the theory behind these actions is de-
signed to place the government in a more proactive policing role once a 
company has shown it is prone to wrongdoing. Instead of leaving the 
company to fix the problems through a compliance program—a strategy 
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that has proven to be ineffectual at many companies—law enforcement 
wants a greater role in changing the corporate culture and also identify-
ing future crimes. This model thus shares a common motivating strategy 
with tactics police officers use to keep close tabs on key gang members, 
in which they threaten to charge them with even minor infractions. If the 
companies that have already committed crimes are, in fact, the key actors 
to watch, the terms of DPAs and NPAs allow the government to watch 
them more closely. 
2. New Tactics in Insider Trading Cases 
In the past few years, the business pages have been overflowing 
with stories about major insider trading cases. There have been 180 civil 
actions
129
 and under the current U.S. Attorney for the Southern District 
of New York, Bharara, there have been seventy-three insider trading 
convictions or guilty pleas.
130
 An investigation into Galleon Management 
is at the center of much of the action. Its founder, Raj Rajaratnam, was 
convicted after a two-month trial and found by a jury to be the hub of a 
$63 million insider trading ring.
131
 Rajat Gupta, the Managing Director 
of McKinsey, was convicted for feeding inside information to Raja-
ratnam. But the investigation into Galleon sweeps far broader than even 
these high-profile cases. The SEC and SDNY prosecutors turned more 
broadly to “expert network” firms which “pair hedge funds and industry 
consultants who, in some cases, offered material, nonpublic information 
for expensive fees.”
132
 This inquiry—dubbed “Operation Perfect 
Hedge”—resulted in fifty-seven criminal convictions since August 2009, 
and fifty-seven enforcement actions at the SEC in 2011 alone.
133
 And the 
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recent indictment of SAC Capital expands the focus to corporate-level 
liability instead of just individual traders.
134
 
Insider trading cases are not new, but a couple policing techniques 
set these recent cases apart. Previously, the typical insider trading case 
came about because one of the enforcement arms of the New York Stock 
Exchange or the National Association of Securities Dealers (today con-
solidated as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, or FINRA), 
noticed suspicious activity around a particular event. Specifically, 
FINRA would run a computerized program after a spike in trading vol-
ume or a significant change in the market price of a stock to identify any 
suspicious trades. FINRA would then follow up with the companies in-
volved to get a chronology of events leading up to the announcement or 
event that caused the change in trading, and it would obtain the names of 
people or companies with access to that information before it was public-
ly released. 
The SEC’s new approach, as noted above, is to do its own data 
analysis, and its methodology is trader-driven instead of solely event-
driven; now the SEC looks for investors who get abnormal returns and 
“patterns in related trades by a single trader or connected group of trad-
ers.”
135
 Khuzami told Congress that the agency is “doing things like can-
vassing all hedge funds for aberrational performance. Anybody who is 
beating the market indexes by 3 percent and doing it on a steady basis, 
we are going to look for them.”
136
 Whereas prior insider trading cases 
largely fell in the category of opportunistic insider trading—someone 
happened to be at the right place at the right time to gain information—
the current crop of cases involve firms pursuing a business model of col-
lecting information from corporate insiders.
137
 Given the incentives of 
that business model, it is not hard to see why the government began a 
targeted policing operation to look more closely at expert network firms 
and hedge funds. The results have been impressive so far: the number of 
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In addition to this shift in focus, there is a second change in tech-
nique that varies from the prior insider trading model. The evidence of 
insider trading under the old model was largely circumstantial and based 
on inferences. In contrast, many recent cases have been built on evidence 
obtained through wiretaps, a novel approach to business crime investiga-
tions.
139
 Although wiretapping is not part of the new policing paradigm, 
its use in the business crime context fits within the theory of the new po-
licing model because it allows prosecutors to go after the broken win-
dows of Wall Street. 
In one sense, insider trading is the opposite of a broken window. 
Whereas a broken window is problematic because it is a visible “signal 
that no one cares,”
140
 insider trading by definition takes place in the 
shadows with nonpublic information.
141
 Market participants, however, 
suspect insider trading is commonplace,
142
 so the absence of prosecutions 
is an analogous sign of neglect to the broken window in plain view.
143
 
The failure of law enforcement to take action sends the same message 
that disorder is prevalent, which in turn erodes the social norms that help 
constrain criminal conduct.
144
 Wiretaps seek to alter that perception by 
suggesting the government does care—because it is listening. Indeed, 
Bharara made this plain at Rajaratnam’s arrest, stating that “privileged 
Wall Street insiders who are considering breaking the law will have to 
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ask themselves one important question: Is law enforcement listening?”
145
 
The onslaught of cases being brought in recent years is designed to make 
market participants—particularly expert network firms—answer that 
question affirmatively.
146
 If industry participants are worried that their 
calls are being recorded or that individuals with whom they are speaking 
could be wearing a wire, they will be less likely to seek out inside infor-
mation. Thus, just as communities that offer rewards for crime tips and 
the reporting of individuals unlawfully possessing guns hope to encour-
age snitching and thereby disrupt behavioral norms,
147
 wiretaps aim to do 
the same thing.
148
 “Part of our job,” Bharara explains, “in exposing these 
cases is to bring people back to a level of confidence in the market.”
149
 
Bharara has sought to buttress social norms of ethical behavior us-
ing another proactive strategy as well. It is obviously not possible for the 
business crime police force to physically walk a beat to interact more 
with the relevant community or to erase tangible signs of neglect. Finan-
cial crime is too broad and amorphous to mimic the tactics of community 
policing in this regard. And the economic-crime police force itself is tiny 
compared to the mammoth industry that requires oversight. By one 
count, “[t]here are roughly three special agents assigned to white-collar 
crime investigations per industry in the U.S.”
150
 But having the symbolic 
chief of that force—or, as the press seems to prefer, the sheriff
151
—speak 
directly to the community is designed to achieve some of the same norm-
changing ends. Bharara has embarked on an outreach program to Wall 
Street that emphasizes the need to create an ethical corporate culture to 
Fortune 500 company directors, business groups, compliance officers, 
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securities lawyers, hedge fund associations, and business schools.
152
 And 
he has explicitly drawn a parallel between his talks and similar efforts by 
law enforcement related to drug trafficking, likening his talks to “the 
meetings that cops and prosecutors tasked with addressing the scourge of 
drug trafficking and violence hold in communities where such crimes 
persist.”
153
 Bharara’s approach has some support in empirical evidence, 
which shows that social norms have a greater deterrent effect than formal 
criminal interventions in deterring corporate misconduct.
154
 So if the 
speeches resonate and help change social norms—admittedly, a big if—
they could have a larger deterrent effect than the prosecutions. 
IV. THE POLITICS OF THE NEW POLICING ON WALL STREET 
Although the broad goals of the new policing approach are the 
same in street crime and business cases—improving deterrence and de-
tection of crime through proactive policing—there are also important 
differences. While some techniques are comparable, such as data genera-
tion to locate patterns and “hot spots” of criminality, others simply do 
not translate. Law enforcement cannot literally walk a beat or become 
part of the fabric of the community in the business crime context. Law 
enforcement has thus sought substitutes, either by seeking virtual access 
to information in the form of consolidated audit trails or by using surro-
gates, such as monitors to report back what they see and hear within a 
company. 
The biggest challenge in policing business crime is determining 
how to change the relevant norms in a corporate environment. This has 
been far from easy in the street crime context and criticisms of existing 
approaches abound.
155
 But it may be even harder to identify the right ap-
proach for business crimes. While law enforcement seeks to change cor-
porate cultures through compliance programs, whistleblowing, insider 
trading policing, and other strategies, it is hard to know just how effec-
tive these mechanisms are. 
In addition to the methodological differences, there are key differ-
ences in the nature of the police themselves in each context. And these 
differences point toward additional promises and pitfalls with using these 
proactive strategies in business crime cases.  
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First, consider what different consequences follow from the fact 
that regulators like the SEC are the front-line police in the context of 
business crime cases. A central criticism associated with the new polic-
ing of street crime is that it gives too much unchecked discretion to po-
lice that, in turn, results in discriminatory enforcement. Thus, some 
scholars have proposed ways to guide and manage that discretion. Debra 
Livingston, for instance, has advocated for the adoption of internal de-
partmental guidelines and a collaborative process for generating those 
guidelines to manage the beat officer’s exercise of discretion.
156
 Alt-
hough that advice appears to have been largely ignored as it applies to 
street crime, this kind of oversight is already built in to the structure of 
the administrative state. Indeed, the administrative state was the model 
for Livingston’s suggestion. So a regulatory actor like the SEC is already 
checked by this kind of process. 
The SEC’s development of the consolidated audit trail provides an 
illustration of how this process influences policing practices in the case 
of economic crime. The audit trail is being developed as part of a notice-
and-comment rulemaking process. Thus, the SEC asked the industry for 
feedback on what would be feasible, and that process has already result-
ed in changes to the Commission’s proposed approach based on com-
ments from the relevant community.
157
 In addition, the Commission is 
poised to make additional modifications as the process unfolds, depend-
ing on how the regulated community responds. Because regulatory police 
operate within a legal framework that is dedicated to policing the arbi-
trary exercise of discretion, many of the most pressing dangers associat-
ed with new policing techniques in the street crime context are mitigated 
or absent when it comes to business crime. 
There is a second difference between street police and regulators 
that is harder to characterize as a benefit or a burden: the politics of over-
sight. In her discussion of mechanisms to control police discretion, Liv-
ingston highlighted the role that political oversight could play in the pro-
cess because the police chief is accountable, either through direct elec-
tion or because he or she needs to answer to an elected official.
158
 But 
Livingston also conceded that the political oversight of police depart-
ments has serious limits. Neighborhoods are not homogenous, and dif-
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ferent groups may possess different levels of political power. This is par-
ticularly true in large urban departments with a wide geographic reach. In 
these environments, the politicians may pay less attention to the interests 
of particular subgroups, specifically young people of color who may lack 
the resources and organization to wield much political power and yet 
bear the brunt of the order-maintenance policing and stops.
159
 So politics 
is at best an uncertain source of boundaries and at worst a prompt for 
overly aggressive policing tactics because voters with the greatest sway 
may be willing to accept the curtailment of others’ liberty to assuage 
their own fears of crime. As Philip Heymann notes, “There is every rea-
son to believe that the great majority of people in almost every city and 
the clear majority of those in the neighborhoods most threatened by both 
insecurity and the risks to civil liberties would, if forced to choose, prefer 
the new forms of policing” because “[t]he advantages of personal securi-
ty are that great.”
160
 In some cases, the voters are not just relying on oth-
ers to be the targets of aggressive policing tactics but are willing to be 
targets themselves. Heymann offers an example where residents of a 
Chicago housing project were willing to relinquish their right to refuse a 
search of their apartments without probable cause to gain what they saw 
as the benefits of that police tactic.
161
 
The political dynamic is different when it comes to business crime. 
For starters, the fear in this context is not the fear of an invasion of one’s 
bodily integrity or physical well-being. Indeed, in most cases, it is not 
even a fear that one’s own property will be taken away. The driving con-
cern with disorder from inadequately policed business crime is that oth-
ers will profit from an unfair advantage. To be sure, it is possible that 
fears will become greater and more personal, with the public and market 
participants starting to worry about another financial meltdown prompted 
by wrongdoing. But that kind of diffuse fear of economic consequences 
is far removed from the more primal concern about one’s physical safety. 
Moreover, it is important to note who will be the target of more ag-
gressive policing. In street crime policing, community residents are the 
target population, so they are the ones who decide whether it is worth the 
tradeoff (whether perceived or real) between liberty and security. In 
business crime policing, more proactive government policing—or regula-
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tion, as the case may be—affects corporate America. And there is no sign 
that any significant segment of corporate America is eager to have great-
er enforcement in the name of making the market operate more fairly. On 
the contrary, greater regulation and oversight have been resisted by just 
about all the major players within corporate America.
162
 
And those players are politically well-situated to resist greater en-
forcement efforts. Whereas the new policing on the street largely targets 
poor and disadvantaged individuals (particularly young ones) who may 
have a hard time opposing the practice because of a lack of organization 
and resources, the targets of the new policing of business crime are pow-
erful enough to place limits on its exercise. The SEC is checked by an 
organized, well-financed community if it goes too far with new policing 
techniques.
163
 This is particularly true with any approach that relies on 
new substantive limits in an effort to change industry norms. During his 
tenure as Chair of the SEC from 1993 to 2001, Arthur Levitt claims con-
gressional overseers constantly threatened him with budget cuts if he 
pursued regulations deemed too aggressive.
164
 Indeed, the dominant criti-
cism of the SEC has been that it is too responsive to the industry it is 
charged with regulating and that it is captured by it.
165
 Critics of the SEC 
claim that the SEC does not go far enough in policing and regulating the 
industry. 
The politics are somewhat different with respect to DOJ and crimi-
nal prosecutors. Criminal prosecutors wield tremendous power, regard-
less of whether the defendant is charged with a street crime or a financial 
crime. Several factors give rise to this power. First, because many crimi-
nal laws are written broadly and more than one crime can be charged in a 
given case, prosecutors can choose from a menu of options.
166
 Second, 
because these laws often have different sentencing ranges, the prosecu-
tor’s choice of which crime to charge affects the defendant’s sentencing 
exposure. And because many laws have mandatory sentencing provi-
sions, the prosecutor can often dictate the particular sentence that will 
apply upon conviction. So when prosecutors bargain with defendants, 
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they can offer to select a law with a more lenient punishment if the de-
fendant pleads guilty and threaten to charge a defendant with a crime that 
carries a harsher punishment if the defendant opts to go to trial. The Su-
preme Court has refused to reject the threat of charging crimes with far 
more serious punishments as placing an unconstitutional condition on the 
exercise of the jury trial right.
167
 The only limit on the exercise of this 
power is that the charge needs to be supported by evidence. Third, feder-
al prosecutors gain additional leverage because they can offer sentencing 
discounts for cooperating with the government and accepting responsibil-
ity.
168
 This dynamic applies whether a defendant has committed a busi-
ness crime or a street crime, and it vests the prosecutor with substantial 
leverage. 
It also applies to corporate defendants. Because the federal standard 
for corporate liability is itself so broad—companies are liable for any 
employee crime that is committed within the scope of employment and 
with the intent to benefit the company—they can easily be charged for 
employee misconduct. And the threat of punishment is often severe, with 
some companies facing the loss of a critical license upon conviction or a 
huge hit in the market if they are publicly traded. Here, too, the result is 
significant leverage over companies. 
This leverage explains why companies are quick to agree to the 
terms of DPAs and NPAs, and individual defendants in 95% of cases—
whether business or street crime—plead guilty.
169
 Moreover, unlike the 
SEC, U.S. Attorneys are not part of a regulatory structure that relies on 
notice and comment rulemaking or judicial review. As a result of less 
oversight, prosecuting attorneys’ discretion is greater. 
Although they face fewer limits on their discretion than the SEC 
and have significant bargaining leverage, prosecutors nonetheless operate 
within a more bounded space than traditional police in the street crime 
context. For starters, those companies that are particularly significant to 
the economy—those entities that are “too big to fail”—are shielded to 
some extent from this dynamic. Prosecutors may not credibly threaten a 
criminal prosecution of these companies because they are also “too big to 
jail.” Attorney General Eric Holder recently admitted as much to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee in a hearing following the government’s 
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decision not to bring an indictment of HSBC despite overwhelming evi-
dence that the company funneled cash to Mexican drug cartels and as-
sisted Saudi banks with ties to terrorists. Holder confessed a general con-
cern that  
the size of some of these institutions becomes so large that it does 
become difficult for us to prosecute them when we are hit with indi-
cations that if you do prosecute, if you do bring a criminal charge, it 




Even when a target is not critical to the overall economy, it may be 
the provider of hundreds of jobs and its fate may also affect thousands of 
shareholders. Lanny Breuer, the former head of the Department’s Crimi-
nal Division, was explicit about the relevance of this factor in the gov-
ernment’s charging decisions. In a recent speech he explained that 
[i]n reaching every charging decision, we must take into account the 
effect of an indictment on innocent employees and shareholders, 
just as we must take into account the nature of the crimes commit-
ted and the pervasiveness of the misconduct. I personally feel that 
it’s my duty to consider whether individual employees with no re-
sponsibility for, or knowledge of, misconduct committed by others 
in the same company are going to lose their livelihood if we indict 
the corporation. In large multi-national companies, the jobs of tens 
of thousands of employees can be at stake. And, in some cases, the 
health of an industry or the markets are a real factor. Those are the 
kinds of considerations in white-collar crime cases that literally 




There is no similar discussion of collateral consequences to communities 
when new policing strategies are used in street crime cases. These third-
party effects thus play a restraining role in business crime cases that are 
absent in the street crime arena. 
There is another reason to believe that prosecutors will not be as 
proactive at policing business crime as street crime. The business com-
munity has greater political power, and if it views particular tactics as 
overly aggressive, it can get powerful overseers in the legislature to take 
on the cause. Federal investigative techniques have already shifted in the 
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face of political pressure. Business interests successfully lobbied Con-
gress to put pressure on DOJ to prevent it from requiring companies to 
turn over attorney–client work product and communications in order to 
get credit for cooperating with the government. To preempt looming leg-
islation,
172
 DOJ changed its position. Cooperation credit no longer de-
pends on whether a corporation waives its attorney–client privilege or 




But even if prosecutors may not police as aggressively in business 
crime cases as in traditional police in street crime cases, that does not 
mean there is no danger of prosecutorial overreaching. For starters, there 
is no evidence that collateral concerns are at issue in cases against indi-
vidual, as opposed to corporate, business crime defendants. And even in 
cases against corporations, the greatest fears of negative effects on third 
parties arise from the consequences that flow from a criminal indictment. 
DPAs and NPAs do not produce the same effects, thus prosecutors can 
be aggressive in demanding concessions in that context, as long as their 
threat to bring criminal charges is sufficiently serious to avoid having 
defendants call their bluff and refusing to agree to the terms of the DPA 
or NPA. 
In cases involving individuals, there is also reason to doubt that 
new policing techniques in business crime cases will be sufficiently 
checked by the political power of the would-be and actual defendants. 
The experience of new policing with street crimes is obviously contro-
versial. The most pointed criticism is based on the racial and income dis-
parities associated with those who are affected by the approach. While 
that concern is unlikely to materialize in the investigation of business 
crime cases, where the policing does not target a particular community 
with a concentrated population of a particular socioeconomic or racial 
background, there are other critiques of new policing. 
Many believe new policing techniques are too intrusive to civil lib-
erties even in the absence of racial disparities in enforcement. Those 
concerns have analogs in the business crime context. The use of wire-
taps, for example, is a relatively intrusive technique because of its poten-
tial to intercept “the most intimate of conversations.”
174
 And, in fact, 
some of the recent insider trading cases have seen this potential realized. 
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In United States v. Goffer,
175
 the FBI recorded “deeply personal and in-
timate discussion[s]” between a target and his wife about their marriage. 
The FBI had used the defendant’s cell phone as a “roving bug” that 
picked up the conversations from the defendant’s bedroom, and they 
failed to stop recording when the calls became personal, which the law 
requires.
176
 This action led Judge Richard Sullivan to label the FBI’s 
conduct “nothing short of disgraceful.”
177
 Wiretaps are an investigative 
technique of last resort precisely because of their potential for this kind 
of abuse; before they are allowed, the government is required to prove 
that other investigative procedures have either been tried and did not 
work or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed.
178
 
It is thus not easy to reach a bottom line on the use of new policing 
techniques in business crime cases. One’s position is likely to depend on 
whether one worries more about agency capture and an enforcement re-
gime that is too lax on white-collar abuses, or whether one’s primary 
concern is that policing in this context may go too far to infringe on lib-
erty and autonomy, and on the operation of the market. Thus, while at 
least some of the differences between enforcement of business crime and 
street crime are clear, the implications are not. What is clear is that the 
proactive model is here to stay, thus bringing all of the good and the bad 
that comes along with it. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Jerome Skolnick and James Fyfe observed that the new policing for 
street crime gained widespread popularity “not because it has been 
proved to work,” but because the approach that came before it proved not 
to work.
179
 It is certainly not hard to see the parallels with business crime 
in that statement. The old policing of business crime failed to stop the 
widespread criminality we see today and a financial meltdown spurned 
on, at least in part, by fraudulent conduct. And whatever the actual rate 
of business crime, the perceived prevalence of it is palpable. Indeed, that 
perception helped spark an entire movement to Occupy Wall Street. 
The impetus for a new policing strategy for business crime is there-
fore evident. But it is far more difficult to give content to what a proac-
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tive approach will ultimately mean in the business context. There are no 
visible broken windows to patch or graffiti to paint over. There is no 
fixed community to gather to assess priorities. The context is far more 
amorphous. Every person involved in commerce is part of the relevant 
community, and the frauds and abuses are not obvious to anyone. Indeed, 
the low number of prosecutions associated with the financial meltdown 
stems in part from an inability to determine who had the requisite crimi-
nal intent. So in this context, the police—the regulators—operate at a 
distinct disadvantage. They cannot point to a patched window or a clean 
park to show their techniques are making a difference. The public will 
not readily observe the SEC’s consolidated audit trail in action. Neither, 
for that matter, will the market participants. 
Thus, it remains an open question not only whether the new polic-
ing will ultimately prove successful in shifting norms and reducing 
crime,
180
 but also whether it will achieve even the more modest goal of 




But despite the uncertainty and difficulty of measurement, there is 
reason for some optimism about the emerging new policing on Wall 
Street. It is, at a minimum, a recognition among the police themselves 
that the prior approach was not working, and that admission is an im-
portant first step. Moreover, many of the methods chosen thus far seem 
to have benefits that exceed their costs. Sophisticated data analysis can 
only help the regulators in identifying trouble spots and areas in need of 
reform. Of all the new policing techniques in the street crime context, the 
ones relying on targeted enforcement based on data showing hot spots or 
key offenders appear to be the most successful at reducing crime.
182
 
There are strong reasons to believe this will be successful in the business 
crime arena as well, which the insider trading cases appear to demon-
strate. These cases are not simply the result of wiretaps, but are part of a 
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sophisticated data analysis that now focuses on particular traders with 
abnormal returns. Data-based analysis is precisely the kind of smart po-
licing technique at the core of new policing models. 
And unlike the new policing techniques that raise concerns with ar-
bitrary and discriminatory application, particularly racially disparate en-
forcement, this emphasis on data is designed to make the enforcement 
process more rigorous and less arbitrary. It is likely to prove useful to the 
SEC in its rulemaking process, leading to generally applicable rules that 
would apply to all industry players. Thus, new business crime policing is 
a method designed to foster uniformity and rationality in ways that new 
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